

Europe in the Global World

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General Introduction

What do we wish to describe in this volume on „Europe in a Global World“? Where does Europe end and when did the European history begin to reach beyond its borders? And why did Europe develop an intimate tendency to transcend its margins? One statement appears definitely true: Europe is a fine term as long as you do not ask what exactly is meant by it. Coined in ancient times it came into use in medieval ages and entailed two different meanings: as a community being threatened from abroad and as a community that had more in common than just being neighboring countries. With long-distant trade, colonialism, imperialism and the beginning of globalization a third level of meaning emerged: the European ambition to mirror itself.

In *these* respects this is going to become a Eurocentric book, for we can and will not write a global history, but a history of “Europe globalizing”. The rise of chauvinistic ‘Euro centrism’, its metamorphoses and many different faces will be one of the guiding questions. That distinguishes this volume from the other contributions, and it adds necessary aspects without which much of the other volumes would remain isolated. Another difference is that it does not focus on peculiar sectors of technology like infrastructure, consumer culture, energy production, or expert knowledge. It traces main fields of interaction between Europe and the rest of the world on many different levels; it follows ways in which Europe sought to be ‘different’ – and most of the times ‘better’ – than cultures abroad.

In trying to explain European ‘peculiarities’ we will follow two different approaches: A *first* circle of subchapters will recall occasions to tell Europeans from ‘others’ and follow discussions of how far Europe actually reached, or was claimed to reach, in all directions – including European networks and standards, colonies, bridgeheads, and finally the third dimension. A *second* set of chapters follows a chronology of actual interaction between Europe and the rest of the world in terms of main fields, main tendencies, main institutions and actors having been involved. We start with one major and highly symbolic event, the London World Fair of 1851, and continue with main turning points, leading institutions or actors, portals of globalization, and events, which shaped the relationship between Europe and the global world up to the present.

So far we do not know much publications rivaling our enterprise: Of course, there are abundant books about European history or the history of Europe, the history of the *idea* of Europe and about the history of European integration. Then there are many studies comparing Europe to other regions of the world, especially Asia and the Americas. And there are lots of records of European commonality and invocations of a common spirit rooted in ancient high culture, Christianity and a shared history.



One of the many maps depicting it as an organism. This one is from Heinrich Bünting (1545-1606).

One of our basic assumptions is that *technology* is not only at the very core of European identity, but at the core of it's influence worldwide. It was technology which took Europeans almost everywhere in the world, e.g. by ships, steam power or aircraft. It was technology in a wider sense that allowed them to survive in "uncivilized" settings, e.g. by medicine or equipment for opening up land and for constructing settlements. It was technology that enabled relatively small numbers of Europeans to conquer and to control huge territories, e.g. by rifles, machine guns, railways etc. It was technology that was applied to exploit resources and to develop the fundamentals of industrial production in the colonies. And it was European technology that was adopted first when the power shifted towards the "indigenous" people, e.g. the telephone lines, the traffic facilities, the broadcast and television infrastructure etc.

It also was technology that remained relatively undisputed as a valuable asset when European colonizers eventually returned to Europe. This technology was built on and sought to be appropriated even further, e.g. by building power plants and energy networks, modern cities, traffic facilities etc. In a wider sense it was European technology and knowledge that was adopted to manage and

organize a given society in the way European nation states were organized – with defined borders, governing and administrating institutions and the rule of law – at least in theory. And it was European material technology that was not only requested but *desired*, first by indigenous elites, then step by step by a majority of non-European people. Even more important appears to be the appropriation of “low tech”, which is older and already used European technology that went to Africa or South America to re-experience a second life there.

Some non-European intellectuals actually realized western technology acting as a Trojan horse to traditional cultures. But although many Non-Europeans knew about the hidden agendas of western technology they could not conceive successful ways to boycott it. The lure and the promise of European technology were almost irresistible, with “getting connected” and “being integrated” to it being essential. In this respect, Europe was as much an “irresistible empire” (Victoria de Grazia) as the United States with its more ostentatious consumer culture. Technology and technology transfer acted as preeminent agents of change and eventually led to a “shared history” between Europe and a globalizing world. This also applied to international standards, regulations and, not in the least instance, the international law: Initially conceived as means to pacify European tensions and to legitimize European intervention into foreign territories the law of nations gradually adopted humanitarian goals and eventually became a reference point every man can appeal to.

What we also deal with are the motives for European expansion after 1850, the most important of which were: curiosity and scientific thirst for a complete knowledge of almost everything; religious missions transforming into civilizing missions, into colonial development, development policy and humanitarian aid at last; trading labor and goods and opening up markets; the acquisition of resources and becoming dependent from them afterwards; fascination, ornamentalism, exotism and eventually tourism; making the world recognizable and secure for Europeans abroad; cosmopolitanism, internationalism and the plea for “human rights”, and, of course, national rivalry. But there have been plenty of other reasons as well, which we will come back to.

During the first stage of their expansion from the 15th century onwards Europe had been eager to adopt foreign knowledge and technology wherever this appeared superior. In this respect Europe can be addressed as the Japan of Early Modern times. During the second stage of European expansionism, at the high tide of colonialism and imperialism after 1850, it mainly were Europeans who could draw on elaborated technologies of all kind and sometimes even appeared to be invincible, due to their compelling military technologies. Much of the fascination the complex of colonialism evoked throughout all social classes in Europe was taken from the victories of an ostensibly superior technology. It was the Europeans who set the technological standards, until they were partly

replaced by the United States, Japan, sometimes the Soviet Union or even China. It was the Europeans pioneering the process of discovering the last unknown spots of the globe and dominating the “Geographies of Empire” (Robin A. Butlin).

Whenever it does make sense to address a “religion of technology” (as David E. Noble once put it) it was nourished by colonial techniques. The religious mission was materialized by colonial infrastructure, by building railways, telephone lines and electricity, accompanied by the knowledge and expertise that enabled its use – that is: writing and education, scientific knowledge, organizational and management skills. And the eager adoption of basic European technologies by cultures from abroad seemed to confirm the ‘civilizing mission’ of the European colonizers in general. Technology therefore is at the very heart of what – outside Europe – is meant by “Europeanization”. It also encompasses the notion of divided labor and production and the excessive usage of technology to interact with nature by ways of submerging it. “Europeanization” could also mean to adopt urban lifestyle and a European consumer culture and so on.



A civilizing steam engine, conceived for the London World fair in 1851.

Of course, imperialism and colonialism were predominantly national endeavors but colonizers in more than one respect felt a common “Europeanness” in sharing a comparable set of skills compared to the others, the colonized people. It was the Europeans who appeared to be the rational, the “technical race”, and in several respects this notion even survived decolonization and all the often frustrating experiences of development aid. The imperative of conquering nature, using resources and fossil energies effectively on a worldwide scale became one of the driving forces of world politics until today. The notion of inventing technology for a common benefit of all mankind has become one of the preeminent roots of globalization. All attempts to exclude certain nations from the adoption of scientific knowledge eventually failed.

Our goal, however, is not merely to assess the European technological impact onto the rest of the world. Authors like Michael Adas or Daniel Headrick already have done this convincingly. We do not wish to record flows of trading goods or statistics about migration from and to Europe like Hans Pohl or Klaus Bade; we are not going to write world history like Christopher Bayly or Jürgen Osterhammel; we do not just concentrate on communication like Armand Mattelard or Peter J. Hugill; we will not compare Europe to other continents and cultures to figure out reasons for its dominance like Eric Jones or Kenneth Pommeranz; we also will not write world history from an environmental point of view like Joachim Radkau or Rolf Peter Sieferle; and finally: we will not, at least not in the first instance, trace the history of innovations or industrious orientations like Vaclav Smil or Jan de Vries.

Our aim is to trace different levels of interaction between Europe and the rest of the world: ecology and agriculture, medicine, political, social and cultural interconnections, especially migration from and to Europe, the migration of labor or the ascendancy of a world market. European expansion, long distant trade and the international division of labor always implied the import of goods, people and problems into Europe as well. Globalizing forces always evoked counter movements and backlash reactions. Nationalistic and even chauvinistic worldviews always opposed what came from outside Europe and plead for walling-off and keeping a homogenized national or European culture, economy, or even race.

Europe in a globalizing world always had to cope with identity problems. One of the European peculiarities was a distinct historicism and the ideas of progress and permanent economic growth, and an almost paranoid notion of placing Europe favorably on cartographic and mental maps – right in the center with the rest of the world graduated below. As we mainly are interested in Europe, we eventually will contribute to a more coherent record of Euro centrism – avoiding, as indicated before, a qualifying perspective that so often was associated to it.

Also on our agenda are anti-European sentiments: Europe remained a major reference point for people abroad until today, but intellectuals of young nation states always criticized this fixation. They often proposed a “third political way” combining the adoption of western technology with preserving indigenous culture. And they coined a recurring paradigm: complaints about a superficial and shallow-brained western civilization with all its seductive potentials were opposed by homemade technologies and traditional cultural orientations, sometimes in fundamentalist grasps. Chief characteristics of the Western “enemy” were: materialism, liberalism, capitalism, individualism, humanism, rationalism, socialism, decadence and moral laxity. Opposes of ‘the West’ often spotted the city, the bourgeois, the rule of reason and feminism as further annoyances. This list could be enlarged almost endlessly: commerce, mixed

populations, artistic freedom, sexual license, scientific pursuits, leisure, personal safety, wealth, and so on, whereas indigenous people (and their advocates) often claimed to preserve soul, heroism, and self-sacrifice.

It is not just Europe as a concept that is constantly re-negotiated; it is also the shared values and the definition of borderlines, of cross sections and cutting areas between Europe and the others. This especially applies to the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey and to Eastern Europe. “Asia” sometimes reached into East Germany, sometimes began behind the Ural Mountains. So we seek to trace the role of defining territory, a shared history or a common future with all its consequences for a definition of what “Europe” meant at different times to different people.

To sum it up: We seek to apply a specific technopolitical perspective, stressing the importance of technology and technologists in this double process of “Europeanizing” the world and “globalizing” Europe. We will describe the dialectics of flows and ways to get control of these flows and circulations of goods, people, ideas, technologies, expertise and capital between Europe and (post)-colonial settings.

We will assess the role of asymmetric power relations when it comes to interaction with other parts of the world in times of colonialism, imperialism, world wars and global governance becoming more and more institutionalised. And we will ask how to deal with the changing geography of centres, peripheries, or ultra-peripheries, but also with proposals to merge synergies in creating a Eurasian, a Eurafrikan, or an Atlantic world.

We will track down the effects of key technologies, their specific momentums, their inherent tendency to transcend borders and integrate spaces and their potentials for opening up territories and leaving cultural imprints on given societies. To sum it up: We will not only evaluate how Europe influenced the rest of the world, but also the extent to which Europe itself became formatted by these contacts. What were the main conflicts, what can be identified as the “dark side” of interaction between Europeans and Non-Europeans? And we will ask for comprehensive “narratives” that can be told and symbolic pictures that can be shown from 1850 to 2000.

Rationale, motivation, and positioning in the historiography

Until now - and despite all the efforts to develop a definition of trans-national history – the new field of historical knowledge lacks systematization, although it has emerged as one of the most productive fields in international historiography today. In our proposal we start from the assumption that trans-national history has its solid basis in the

increasing interest of scholars in all kinds of flows (of ideas, goods and people) transcending the boundaries of single societies and states. But it is much more than a calculation of incoming and outgoing mobility. It includes the various attempts to control, to bloc or to channel these flows and all the social configurations resulting from the confrontation of individuals or a given society with challenges created by this dialectics of flow and control.

Societies thus have to manage two challenges at the same time: to remain on the one hand efficiently connected at a time of global markets and of increasing importance of (mutual) intercultural learning processes, and to develop administrative/political forms and cultural patterns to guarantee integration to a degree that secures stability of the whole social formation on the other hand. De-territorialization by border-transcending processes and re-territorialization by processes to mark new borders against competitors, foreigners etc. are closely linked together and characterize modern “world history in an age of globalization” (*Geyer/Bright*). The integration of Europe seems to be nothing else than a new aspect in that story and one may ask specifically why at a certain moment exactly this kind of re-territorialisation appeared to whom as appropriate.

Transnational perspectives on different parts of the world become more and more prominent, but while for some areas (like the US or North America more generally) we have a couple of good examples how to write transnational histories for Europe we are in a state of infancy. This does not mean that there are not wonderful examples of ongoing empirical research in various fields of transnational history, especially in the fields of infrastructure and technology, and, of course, an inspiring methodological debate nourishes conferences and collective volumes as well as academic journals, but what is missing for the time being is a synthesis situating a transnational Europe in the wider framework of a globalizing world.

There is, of course, no doubt about the transnational character of Europe. This transnationality of Europe was conceptualised often as “Europe as and at the power centre of the world” or as “the world following the European way to modernise”. These paradigms of “Europeanization” for good reason came under critic, but “Provincializing Europe” is a renewed invitation for interpreting the transnational character of Europe (*Bayly, Osterhammel etc.*). In this context, concepts as linking/de-linking, circulation and appropriation become particularly useful, as they unveil an European economic, political, scientific and technological landscape built on a continuously changing

relationship between collaborative and opposite projects (*Schot/Misa*). Therefore, the motivation for this book is to bring together results from empirical work (not necessarily done by the authors themselves) with the development of categories which will allow to present a structured transnational history of Europe that is more than an enumeration of phenomena where Europeans, European societies or an institutionalised Europe (for example in form of the EU) transcends its borders.

The chapters we present in more detail under item 5 are constructed around leading questions with a particular focus on technology, but not with the ambition to narrate an exhaustive transnational European history from its very beginnings to the present. This certainly would be impossible both with respect to the numbers of pages available *and* with regard to the state of the art. Neither do we know enough about all the aspects to be dealt with nor is it logically possible to write shared or entangled history from the perspective of any positivist approach.

Aims and research questions

The proposed book investigates how Europeans encountered other parts of the world, to what extent this interaction with people perceived as representatives of otherness (and thus contributing to the self-definition of “Europeaness”) changed both Europe *and* the world. It is conceptualised as part of a history of the globe, but with special emphasis – and a necessary concentration – on the place Europe and Europeans have occupied within this world or where looking for. Each chapter follows a specific research question which is part of the overall aim of the book and will lead to a (hopefully) convincing methodology of how to investigate transnationality and how to narrate the history of Europe not only from an inward-looking perspective but to complement it by positioning Europe in the wider context of a world starting its modern period of globalisation exactly at the time covered by the book: 1850-2000.

The volume will start with a strong introductory chapter, presenting the rationale of the book and discussing the main historiographical, conceptual and methodological issues that underlie the volume. Here we see the chance to make a substantial contribution to the international discussion of approaches and methods in transnational and global history. However, it will not remain an abstract debate, but will lead to the empirically grounded discussion of the (to our mind) most important features of Europe’s transnationality: definitions on how Europe was seen and levels on

which Europe was perceived or conceptualized as a unity. Here, not only the accuracy of discrimination will be essential but a sense for the complex European reactions to the loss of empires. A second, more empirically rooted bloc will deal with different fields of interaction between a “dynamized” and technology-driven Europe and the world and with political, economic, strategic, scientific, technological, mental or even individual reasons for migration, trade, civilizing missions or whatever interaction. Separate views for Europe outside the European space as well as for Non-Europeans inside Europe should be included. The volume will finish with some interim conclusions and a tentative assessment on the question whether or not European “peculiarities” can be made out.

Research strategy and research basis

As explained above this book is a combination of original research done by the authors either in previous times or when writing the book on the one hand and of a careful reading of contributions from an ongoing debate on how to do transnational history (of Europe). With the proposed structure we react to focal points of that debate and add a specific technopolitical perspective, stressing the importance of technology and technologists in this double process of “Europeanizing” the world and “globalizing” Europe:

- the role of de- and re-territorialisation with its consequences for a definition of what “Europe” meant at different times to different people;
- the dialectics of flows and ways to get control of these flows (of goods, people, ideas, expertise and capital); the process of circulation of technologies, experts, and expertise between Europe and (post) colonial settings, and between colonial powers in the colonial period, through decolonization, and in the post-colonial world;
- the role of asymmetric power relations when it comes to interaction with other parts of the world in times of colonialism, imperialism, world wars and global governance becoming more and more institutionalised; how to deal with the a changing geography of centres, peripheries, or ultra-peripheries;
- the effects of key technologies (e.g. railways, steam ships, telegraphy), their specific momentums, their inherent tendency to transcend borders and integrate spaces and their “hidden agendas” for opening up territories and leaving cultural imprints on given societies;
- the importance of mental maps, imagined spaces abroad, definitions of cultural and historical development. The permanent encounters with something “different” set

free lots of irritations and caused ambivalent attitudes: confidence, fears, ascriptions of superiority/inferiority etc.; the concepts of “civilising mission” and “local elites”; ideological uses of technology; the definition of European vs. indigenous;

- the main fields where the contact between Europe and other parts of the world influenced the development of both: the emergence of world markets; the construction of a world-wide infrastructure for transport and communication; colonialism; migration or international organisations;
- the extent to which Europe became formatted by these contacts: the category of portals of globalisation allows to ask where Europeans met at first hand the non-Europeans and what have been the consequences for the population of those places in comparison to others not being exposed to the same extent (at least for long time if not till the present) to the immediate consequences of “globalisation”. Here we ask what kind of “cultural capital” was gained by those being in contact with the “outer world” for centuries.

Most of the times Europe met with other parts of the world in conflict, therefore its transnational history cannot be written as a story of peaceful encounter and increasing entanglement to the profit of both sides, but only as part of the history of war, military interventions, occupation, expansion, racial clashes, sometimes even with genocidal effects. The use of concepts as centre, periphery, and ultra periphery, linking and de-linking of territories, will be explored.

Since we feel inspired by approaches like cultural transfer and entangled histories of mutual influence we will add to the classical perspective of how European influenced the world an investigation on how Europe transformed itself by learning from others, by implementing foreign cultural element into its own identity and cultural patterns: there is a large debate about the influence of North America on European patterns of consumption or its political culture, but there is – despite some pioneering studies done for only a few European societies – much less on Sovietisation. At least a third dimension has to be added to that kind of debate dealt with in another strand of literature (often separated and even isolated from the discussion on Americanisation): the colonial empires striking back. A comprehensive overview of these three dimensions of “cultural learning” processes is needed, but it is not as simple as an additive approach combining these three sources of inspiration would suggest: the question here is where all these tendencies converge into one European culture if something like this exists.

Contribution of the proposed volume to the book series

As we wouldn't like to repeat all the points made above on the necessity to see European history from a transnational or global perspective, we would emphasise here more on the aspect of integrating the history of technology to our approach. More or less everyone will agree that colonial and post-colonial issues are critical to our understanding of Europe. One cannot talk about the history of Europe while ignoring its colonial past and, more recently, its relationship with the new post-colonial world. Both the acquisition and loss of colonies have influenced not only European social and political relations but also the changing definition of "Europe." Scholars have recognized that many colonisers only discovered and defined their own European identity in the colonial context. It is also impossible to understand the present situation of Europe in the global arena without considering the history of its formation as a world actor during the colonial period.

The new economic trends of the nineteenth century, in particular the need for new markets and new sources of raw materials, led entrepreneurs to overseas territories in Africa, South America, and Asia. Similarly, the geopolitical agreements of the Berlin Conference led to new perceptions of the relationship between European and non-European spaces. Science and Technology played a crucial role both in this process of economic overseas expansion and in the new post-colonial world (*Headrick, Macleod, Adas, etc.*). Although technology has been commonly identified as a critical component in the rise of both empire and post-colonial development projects, much less well-investigated is the influence on Europe of technological developments related to the tropical world and how the process of hybridization that took place as was perceived from the European point of view. It is important to focus on the way European nations build their own identity and defined their space in the international scene by using an imperial power strongly technologically based.

Adopting our attention to colonial history unveils a history of tensions among European States, disclosing an intricate network of interests which involves both the most powerful countries and the peripheral ones. Great Britain and France extended their leadership by using their colonial territories; Germany redesigned its national agenda by demanding to be part of the "division of the world"; Spain envisaged its territories in Northern Africa as critical to its prestige; smaller countries such as Portugal, Belgium or the Netherlands claimed their space in the European arena by deriving power from their empires. It is indeed a history of nation states, fiercely defending their

own interest vis-à-vis the non-European world, actively building each one's sphere of influence. But historians of nationalism had long ago established tight relations between the rising of national ideologies and colonial expansion. A nation-state "disruptive", "delinking" history is balanced by the building of the European identity vis-à-vis the colonies. In fact, the "tools of the empire" always played a double folded role: on one hand, European empires and their global expansion demanded a sort of inter-imperial coordination present in such institutions as the International Telegraph Union or the International Meteorological Organization; on the other hand one cannot miss the obvious by not perceiving in the lay down of infrastructures the material expression of national imperial policies. The conversion of the Eiffel Tower into a monumental antenna in the beginning of the twentieth century broadcasting time signal and aligning clock hands across Europe should be seen firstly in the context of British and French imperial rivalries (*Galison*). The development of wireless transmission is a significant example of how a technology developed for colonial rule contributed to the independence of one empire, but it also suggests how a technology first conceived for separating empires could contribute for a hidden European integration through time synchronization (*Geyer/Paulmann*), thus revealing the tensions that form the ground of our common intellectual agenda.

Colonial technology also played another double folded role: on the one hand it allowed, through the construction of networks of infrastructures (railways, harbours, telegraphs, sanitation) in the colonies to "domesticate" human and non-human subjects, in a double process of "Europeanizing" the world and "globalizing/provincializing" Europe. This was no automatic process, but a conflicting one often showing the difficulties of transferring and/or adapting European technologies in tropical latitudes and the distance between the colonial rhetoric and its translation in the landscape (the scarcity of resources so often invoked by the colonial elites). On the other hand, colonial territories were used as experimental fields for metropolitan engineers (and as field laboratories for European scientists): knowledge and professional and/or political status was acquired by European technical experts from their involvement in colonial technology and science. Moreover colonial territories were a very dynamic job market that supported the circulation of technologies, experts, and expertise both between Europe and colonies and between colonial powers. A significant number of scientific and technological institutions were created to support this new worldwide science and technology, and if one follows the trajectories of many of these engineers one soon finds out that such an experience had great consequences for their subsequent activity

in Europe. In some cases, it was hard for these technicians to distinguish between colonizing Africa and Asia and colonizing their own European motherland (e.g. *Fischer-Tiné*).

Moreover, the colonial experience is not only an affair between Europeans and non-Europeans in overseas territories: close relations between European fascism and the colonial experience are a pertinent subject at least since Hannah Arendt's famous work on the origins of totalitarianism. Such connections have now become obvious for the Nazi ambitions toward Eastern and South-eastern Europe. Current research on Nazism, science and technology has shown how relevant it is to perceive politics towards Eastern Europe as colonial rule. But, as pointed out earlier in this proposal, the impact of the colonial experience also cannot be separated from the discussion of Americanisation and Sovietisation and the context of Cold War. As already stated, the colony was thus a privileged trial field for technologies that would later be brought into Europe. The European post-colonial agenda, as the colonial one, has been also strongly technologically driven. A very significant part of the cooperative projects between European countries and their old colonies are technological projects. The way these projects play a crucial role in the new political order established in Africa or in Asia still remains to be fully understood. This also applies for the late- and post-colonial situations in which science and technology often remained among the closest ties between Europe and its former colonies.

Much of European contemporary history passes through the colonial and the post-colonial world. This is a little more obvious for countries with colonial empires like Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal or Spain. This makes for a huge portion of Europe and it might be seen as a sufficient argument to make the subject of colonial technology a central one to this book. Nevertheless, we would suggest that colonial and post-colonial approaches are also relevant for Eastern Europe countries, not only by way of the German connection but also through novel ways of looking to the Russian and the Soviet empire that overcome the old distinctions between overseas empires and continental annexations. The perspective of a "global Cold War" (*Westad*) at least asks for the inclusion of the Eastern hemisphere into the worldwide competition of the two blocs. Not the least aspect should be the European imagination since 1914 at least to be a potential object of colonization from abroad itself – be it from Asian labourers or technologies, from Soviet dominance after 1945 or, most prominent, from US industries and mass culture.

Table of content

This is of course a tentative outline, but at the same time it indicates very well division of labour we have foreseen in order to make the work for the volume manageable:

1. **Preliminaries:** including an outline of what follows, which perspectives are applied, what intentionally is left out, what the peculiar focus is compared to the other volumes, a statement concerning “Eurocentrism” and anti-European sentiments, the concepts of cultural transfer, appropriation, hybridization, or competitive learning, an analysis of changing constellations, the interdependency between nationalization and globalization, the time period from 1850 to the present etc.

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2 **Europe – but what it is and where is it located?**

- 2.1 **Views from inside and outside:** some empirical proofs, telling examples and iconic pictures
- 2.2 **Different assessments and target setting:** This chapter deals with key concepts, which had been attributed to Europe and were subject of major discussions from 1850 onwards, e.g. the notion that the rests of the world are going to be “Europeanized” and up to the recent hypothesis that Europe is about to be “provincialized”. Europe turns out to be a moving target or a container concept for interests in setting agendas for a European commonality rooted in “shared values”. Also included: “Good old Europe”, “Paneuropa”, “Atlantropa”, “Third Ways” between superpowers, “dark continent”, the European Union, “shared values”, “transnational networks” etc.
- 2.3 **Defining levels:** regionalism, nationalism, European integration, trans-, supra- and internationalism, globalism, cosmopolitanism, center/periphery, racial or cultural distinctiveness etc.), borders/frontiers (towards Islam, the “Asian” East, the “colored people”, “people without history”, “Fortress Europe”, the “Soviet bloc”/Iron Curtain, the Near East etc.), and distant mirrors (United States, Africa, China/Japan, the “Orient”), machines as a measure of man etc.
- 2.4 **Europe defining itself:** in comparison and competition to other continents and global rivals, esp. the United States, Japan, China and other Asian countries, geographical or geopolitical definitions etc., “Imagined Europeans”, e.g. as the

“industrious people” or “technical race”, “the West”, the “Atlantic community”, “the rich” vs. “the poor” etc.

- 2.5 Europe being seen, experienced and defined by “the others”:** In this chapter images of Europeans as colonizers, technicians, cultural imperialists etc. are recapitulated, as being drawn by all those people which interacted – or were forced to interact – with Europeans and recognized them as “different”. One question will be, whether or not Europeans were realized by “the others” as a coherent nation, race, or culture or whether they could be told from another as members of different – and rivaling – nations. In almost every case the confrontation was accompanied by the experience of violence, dominance, dependency, devaluation, marginalization etc. Nevertheless Europe also served as a paradigm and as a space of aspiration etc.

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- 3. Europe interacting with the world:** namely attempts to control, to channel, to block the flows abroad and flows into Europe, as well as unintended side effects, incl. the tools of interaction, extraction, expansion, empire and control, leaving “old”, “used” or “Creole” technologies in the rest of the world, but also adopting foreign technologies or creating “appropriate” technologies
- 3.1 Reasons for interaction:** interventionism (anti-slavery movement, religious and civilizing missions, human rights, preventing another “Holocaust”, development policy and humanitarian aid etc.), curiosity and fascination, thirst for scientific knowledge, making the world “legible” and calculable, ornamentalism, love of adventure, need for raw materials, exotic goods and energy, assisting social or socialist “progress”, geopolitical considerations, export of domestic tensions, recruitment of useful migrants, the ideology to open up and develop foreign territories, opening up markets, searching test fields for new technologies etc.
- 3.2 Expansion, colonialism, imperialism, decolonization, development:** the colonial infrastructure at home and abroad, supplementary spaces, colonies as laboratories, but also the late colonial development plans and the European remnants of science and technology in post-colonial states etc.
- 3.3 The international division of trade and labor:** market structures, tariffs, global products and production chains, cash flows, labor (incl. slavery, forced labor, seasonal work and migrant labourers), world companies, the creation of basic infrastructures and the transfer of European science and expertise etc.
- 3.4 Networking the world:** traffic and communication, incl. processes of synchronization and standardization, scientific and technocratic internationalism, agents and modes of interconnectivity, international organizations, technology transfer etc.

- 3.5 **Portals of globalization:** missions, schools, harbours, immigrant quarters, translators, global cities, airports, camps, world fairs etc., understood as two-way gateways of interaction
- 3.6 **People on the move:** emigration and immigration, exiles and asylums, tourism etc.
- 3.7 **Agents of Europe in the global world:** ideas, goods, diplomats, spies, merchants, traders, sales managers, engineers, personnel of development aid, doctors, the military, colonial administrators, foreign cultural and educational policy etc.
- 3.8 **Conflicts:** screening the “dark side” of interaction between Europeans and Non-Europeans including strategic considerations, mental maps of potential future conflicts, racial clashes, violent encounters, economic competition, the World Wars, European military interventions/wars in the colonies/the Third World etc. In opening up and researching the globe scientifically Europe had to be “placed” anew, the last 150 years can be viewed as an almost continual “replacement” of Europe on its own mental maps, seen from the European perspective of seeking hegemony or keeping balance among rivaling nations globalization meant realizing ever new competitors and a continuous redefinition of strategies.
- 3.9 **Changing Europe from outside:** Americanization, Sovietization, influence of anti-colonial movements, decolonization and Third World theories, fears of international rivalry and of being colonized etc.

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- 4. **Interim results:** How Europe influenced and was influenced by the rest of the world between 1850 and today. Are there any European peculiarities? How about a reasonable periodization that can be stated in the history of Europe in the global world? Are there comprehensive “narratives” that can be told from 1850 to 2000?

Reference Literature:

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