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### Performance, Citizenship and the Knowledge Society: a new mandate for European education policy

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# Performance, Citizenship and the Knowledge Society: a new mandate for European education policy

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**ABSTRACT** *In this paper we map out the debate concerning a new mandate for European education policy based on recent socio-economic, political and educational developments, seen from the perspective of educational researchers located on the European (semi)periphery. The first part of the paper looks at the category 'preparation for the labour market', while the second part concerns itself with the category 'citizenship'. With regard to the former, it is argued that a new mandate for European education policy finds itself inextricably linked to the new education mandate of the new middle class, in a setting of globalisation and, closer to home, European construction. The latter attempts to conceptualise the emergence of new forms of citizenship at a time when the modern social contract suffers a process of transformation (or, what we term, reconfiguration). Based on the distinction between 'attributed citizenship' and 'demanded citizenship', we analyse changes taking place in state regulation as well as explore some of their implications for schooling.*

## **Introduction**

Edite Cresson's white paper on the knowledge society (1995) constitutes an important document in the development of European education policy. Central to the document is the concept of competencies, which are brandished as being fundamental to success in this new knowledge, or learning, society. This society not only 'alters the funding of enterprises (firms), it also lays out new horizons for education and training' (1995, p. 8).

The concept of competencies appears as the key mediator between the world of production and the field of education: to be competent is to acquire the capacity to constantly recycle oneself, to have the ability to be permanently retrained (Bernstein 2001). Europe takes on the task of becoming a learning society in order to be competitive with both Japan and the USA. Thus a new mandate for education policy appears to be developing directed at orienting the elaboration of policy at the nation-state level. Dale, in a recent work, refers to 'The European Social Model' and the role of social policy 'in making a fundamental and essential contribution to economic

policy' (2001, p. 4), which includes the idea of the 'EU as agenda-setter in education' (*ibid*, p. 6). This mandate is structured around the concept of competencies, which are conceived, above all, as performance-driven, and which tend to treat performance and learning as if they were mutually exclusive.

The concept of competencies introduces, most of the time implicitly, into discourses on social policy in general and into discourses on education policy in particular, the characteristic of 'adaptability' to permanent 'environmental change' as crucial to both individual and organisational survival. All that tries to resist the transformations that are taking place, mainly in the world of production, is condemned to perish: from professional careers to present organisational features, everything must take part in the process of transformation. In the midst of such change, education appears as a privileged field of action. This is due to the fact that 'flexibility' is being conceptualised in EU political discourse as the only way to guarantee 'employability' (to be 'employable' means to have the right—meaning flexible—competencies) and because knowledge has become a central factor of production. It is our contention that it is in this context that the emergent mandate calling for 'educational performance' should be framed.

We will argue that, when one analyses the gap that exists between pedagogy's impact on the educational process (namely the effects of the basic assumption that the main goal of education is the development of the individual independently of its social and economic relevance) and the emergent mandate calling for educational performance (both at the organisational level and at the individual level, with its emphasis on the economic and social relevance of education), one must conclude that such a dichotomy is itself induced by the very debate taking place between pedagogy and performance. Additionally, we will argue that political claims based on pedagogy alone may lead to an educational vacuum, while those based solely on performance may lead to a simplistic and unrefined reduction of education to economy.

Another important aspect of a new mandate for European education policy is the reconfiguration of the modern social contract as part of the re-conceptualisation of citizenship as difference. Indeed, one can argue that differences have rebelled against the cultural, political and epistemological yoke of western modernity, refusing to be classified as passive objects to be known like the 'primitive' that anthropology took as its object of study or like the mythical-magical thinker, without history and without state, that received the intellectual favours of scientific thought. What characterises differences and their social relations today is precisely their heterogeneity and their inescapable resistance to any attempts at epistemological or cultural domestication. The implications of the rebellions of differences for the concept and practices of citizenship are profound. Given the cultural diversity of the European space, new forms of citizenship will be central to the project of European construction and, thus, central to a new mandate for European education.

### **The Rise of Performance as a Culture of Learning**

After the effects of the post-Fordist mandate, that began to feed into core-country education systems during the late 1970s and early 1980s, became apparent, resulting

from the fragmentation of work and the restructuring of professions and where 'transferable skills' began to play an increasingly important role, it can be argued that a new culture of learning based on the claim of academic excellence started to appear. Part of the new middle classes, feeling their present and future life styles threatened by such a change, sought to regain the upper hand in a context where 'performance' became the keyword, both at the political and pedagogical levels. Performance and transferable skills, in their proximity to the demands of the labour market, tend to require a learning context based on an explicit, 'visible', pedagogy that involves their being separated from pedagogy as a process (with its mainly implicit, or 'invisible' pedagogy) while they take on an increasingly central role in the elaboration of education policy. Hence, the emergence of a new learning culture which is a combination of (i) the assertion of a pedagogy of teaching (transmission) in secondary education in accordance with the traditional tension associated with the new middle class which, as Bernstein has argued (1978), promotes invisible pedagogy in primary education but as entry onto the labour market gets nearer switches over to explicit transmission pedagogy, and (ii) supporting even at the level of primary education a visible pedagogy either because a concern with labour market entry now occurs earlier on in schooling (particularly true in a country like Portugal where many youths leave school after the 9th year and particularly true in a socio-economic context where entry into the labour market is more problematic than it was during Fordism) or because, even at these levels of schooling, pedagogy as process is seen as undermining academic excellence (crucial to a successful economy in an epoch of globalisation).

As both Giddens (1994) and Apple (1998; 2000) have noted, emphasis on the decrease of academic standards and on the unworkable features of progressive models of teaching are central arguments of a rather *contra natura* coalition of neo-liberals and neo-conservatives in their attack on public schooling. The organising concept for this alliance appears to be 'performance', arguably a major plank in 'conservative modernisation' (Dale, 1989), which is set up against a concern with pedagogical processes. The concept of 'performance' has emerged as part of the legitimating discourses on post-Fordism. Knowledge in this context appears as both a central factor of production and as a medium for the functioning of market relations. Indeed, Bernstein refers to:

A new concept both of knowledge and of its relation to those who create it (. . .) Knowledge should flow like money to wherever it can create advantage and profit. Indeed, knowledge is not just like money: it *is* money. (. . .) Knowledge, after nearly a thousand years, is divorced from inwardness and is literally dehumanised. Once knowledge is separated from inwardness, commitment and personal dedication, then people may be moved about, substituted for each other, and excluded from the market. (1990, p. 155)

Knowledge, in this sense, instead of qualifying the individual, transforms the individual into a set of cognitive-driven competencies. Knowledge no longer educates the individual and society, rather it becomes a tool for positioning individuals on (or

excluding them from) the labour market. One of the results of this transformation is a process of *individualisation* where individuals are reduced to their 'performance' (similar to Castoriadis' notion of the 'privatised individual' (1998)). Market regulation only recognises individuals on whom is placed the onus for both the excesses and the deficits of the market.

As a result, pedagogy is attacked and questioned, in terms of its social and political utility, on the basis of its assumption that knowledge is part of inwardness—as it gives value to and qualifies the individual—instead of realising that such an assumption tends to make schooling inefficient, overly concerned with the individual as subject and less concerned with knowledge as a factor of production. In other words, instead of concern with the output of the educational process, and knowledge as an element of mere 'throughput', pedagogues are concerned with the effects of input on the individual and social developmental processes.

In Portugal the simultaneous crisis and consolidation of mass schooling (*cf.* Stoer & Cortesão 1995) is also inspiring the rise of 'performance culture'. The simultaneous crisis and consolidation of mass schooling involves oscillation between a preoccupation with a pedagogy of teaching based on the transmission of knowledge—in which the centrality of the knowledge to be transmitted determines the pedagogical process—and a concern with a pedagogy of learning in which the socio-cultural and educational characteristics of the pupil take on a central role in the teaching-learning process. As we have argued above, the first perspective can be referred to as the performance approach to pedagogy and the latter as the pedagogical approach to pedagogy.

With regard to the former, two presuppositions are implicit and taken for granted: (i) the knowledge to be transmitted has in itself a positioning potential and, therefore, it can be separated from the pedagogical process—pedagogy and performance are seen as independent from each other; (ii) the pedagogical recontextualisation of knowledge, to use Bernstein's expression (1990), in which the teacher takes an active part is socially and culturally neutral. As a result, the educational process tends to be reduced to both the teacher's transmission performance and to the pupil's reproduction performance. There have been claims by sociologists and opinion makers that the teaching-learning process must be focused on teachers' academic and professional competencies linked to the effective transmission of knowledge (Mónica, 1997; Fernandes, 2001) and on pupils' competencies in reproducing this *corpus*. In many ways, similarities with the Durkheimian model of education can be found: education is the socialisation of the younger generation by their elders (Durkheim, 1978).

With regard to the latter, at the basis of the pedagogical approach to pedagogy lies the gardening metaphor: *laissez croître*. The pupils as subjects are the core of the learning process, not the knowledge to be transmitted. According to this perspective, if learning does not take place in the teaching-learning process the reasons for this must be found in the teachers' actions, in institutional structures and processes, in education policies, etc., anywhere but in the child. In this extreme perspective (for instance the experience of Summerhill comes to mind), the claim for academic excellence does not make sense (it becomes, rather, almost a dirty word), for the goal

to be achieved is emancipation (*tout court*). This is also the reason why militant pedagogy is so critical of the concept of evaluation: it is seen as functioning mainly on the basis of reducing educational processes to performance indicators.

The opposition between the two approaches appears to be more than simply one of adopting a pedagogical method. Indeed, the opposition between 'performance' and pedagogy reflects a political debate based on two different conceptions of the development of mass schooling: on the one hand, the idea that the consolidation of mass schooling depends upon a participatory and emancipatory pedagogy resulting in an authentically democratic school; on the other, the idea that meritocratic schooling based on 'performance' holds the key to success in a post-Fordist labour market based on knowledge competencies. The debate appears to take place as if the consolidation of mass schooling according to the former meant continuing loss of academic excellence, the meritocratic model being the only way out.

### **Schooling in a Post-Fordist Environment: the debate over the relationship between 'performance' and academic excellence**

In fact, there exist two further conceptions of the development of mass schooling that introduce important nuances that need to be taken into consideration. The first is a conception, still largely identified with Fordism, that sees meritocratic schooling as based on individual talent and merit. Here representative democracy and the principle of equality of opportunity are seen as the norm. The second, more identified with the post-Fordist context, sees democratic schooling also capable of developing through the consolidation of meritocratic schooling. At stake is the relationship between education and social change which, rather than being seen as domination, either in the form of social engineering or as a relationship leading necessarily to emancipation, is seen as a reflexive attempt to manage social change (*cf. Cortesão et al., 2001*). Also the process by way of which the individual becomes central in the post-Fordist context, rather than being seen as based on individualisation is seen as a process of individuation where the reflexive individual becomes master of his/her own choices (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990; Beck *et al.*, 1994).

The debate over 'performance' in schooling appears to be taking place as if pedagogy were its opposite, where 'performance' is the keyword, interpreted in its postmodern sense as the attempt to obtain maximum output on the basis of minimum input (Lyotard, 1986). However, this is only one way of focusing the issue which is incapable of portraying the whole picture, creating and perpetuating in its turn a false dichotomy between academic excellence and pedagogy. Indeed, 'performance' is a concept that can also be seen as containing a pedagogic content. For example, for progressive pedagogues, like Paulo Freire for instance, 'performance' can also be defined as that which is central to Barnett's notion (1997) of 'critical being', where the domains of knowledge, the self and the world are appropriated by critical thinking skills as a process of reaching 'critical dialogue' (1997, pp. 66–68). In both these polar positions with regard to 'performance', it is the concept in itself which is given absolute value: in the first case, with regard to the maximisation of results, and, in the second, with regard to the self-development of the subject.

**Performance as Critical Being:** *Democratic Schooling 1*—Emancipatory Pedagogy

*Academic Excellence based on Subject of Learning Process: Democratic Schooling 2*—Learning Pedagogy/Transmission Pedagogy—there is no ‘performance’ without pedagogy

*Academic Excellence based on Knowledge to be Transmitted: Meritocratic Schooling 1*—Transmission Pedagogy/Learning Pedagogy—pedagogy without ‘performance’ leads to an educational and socio-economic vacuum

**Performance as Maximum Output achieved through Minimum Input:** *Meritocratic Schooling 2*—‘Performance’—knowledge as money

FIG. 1.

Between these two polar positions, we find other nuanced positions where ‘performance’ takes on a different meaning, particularly when related to the consolidation of mass schooling, be it via the meritocratic route, be it via emancipatory-driven democratic schooling. With regard to the latter, to the extent that a pedagogy based on learning does not negate a pedagogy based on teaching, ‘performance’ is not opposed to the process of the self-development of the subject. Indeed, here ‘performance’ is defined as incorporating pedagogy itself, i.e., there is no ‘performance’ without pedagogy—even the most directly transmissive teaching processes require pedagogical recontextualisation, for example in the adaptation of the scientific text for the purposes of teaching. With regard to the former, the subaltern position of a pedagogy of learning with regard to a pedagogy of teaching attributes to ‘performance’ a predominant meaning identified with the efficient *effectiveness* of the socialisation process of younger generations, i.e., it is argued that pedagogy without ‘performance’ leads to an educational and socio-economic vacuum. Therefore the assumption is that ‘good’ pedagogy is precisely that pedagogy which produces the ‘best’ results; in other words, meritocratic schooling is the first and foremost promoter of social mobility (Fernandes, 2001).

The issue of academic excellence is only relevant for these latter two positions. For the other two polar positions, a concern with academic excellence is clearly a non-issue: emancipatory-driven democratic schooling rejects a clear link, on the one hand, between labour market concerns and the competencies it requires and, on the other, the educational process; meritocratic post-Fordist schooling places all its emphasis on the competencies acquired through schooling, being totally oblivious to the individual or collective qualities of the subject. Academic excellence, in fact, only becomes an issue for those positions that aim at relating education with ‘performance’.

### **Schooling in a Post-Fordist Environment: the new middle class, the labour market and the re-composition of skills**

One can argue that the following assumptions frame new middle-class perceptions of meritocratic schooling:

1. Mass schooling puts at risk the 'quality' of the teaching-learning process, i.e. new middle-class parents are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that their children's schools have been 'invaded' not only by children coming from working class families but also from cultural minority groups.
2. Mass secondary schooling puts at risk the 'distinction' strategy (*cf.* Bourdieu, 1986), i.e. secondary schools no longer sufficiently prepare their youth for university studies. This assumption is slightly different from the previous one in that it stresses the fact that it is not sufficient to provide middle-class students only with 'good' teaching pedagogy. Students *must* achieve 'excellent' results if they intend to enter the university's gates and, even more importantly, to be able to choose which gate they want to enter. The choice of the secondary school one wishes to attend, therefore, becomes crucial in guaranteeing preparation where one 'really' 'learns'. Thus an emphasis on 'performance' makes up for what is seen as insufficient pedagogy.
3. Mass schooling puts at risk the production of competencies relevant to post-Fordist labour market needs. As the visibility of post-Fordism increases, the new middle classes tend to elaborate strategies that will provide their children with the education needed to make a successful transition from schooling into the world of work.

Presently, the political debate on education appears to be hegemonised by discourses centred on 'performance', competencies and labour market needs. It can be argued that these discourses appear as middle-class strategies in the context of the changing nature of work and the labour market. With regard to those occupations identified with the middle classes, work was defined until recently as closely linked to the social category of profession. Work was a set of technical gestures and individual and group attitudes normally developed within the scope of an institution (business firm, corporation, etc.) within which labour activities took place. Unified under the label of a profession, work was also central to the individual's identity. Modern times under capitalism increased this tendency to identify individuals by way of their profession (for example, when asked of an individual, 'Who are you?', the response often came in the form of professional identity: 'I am a teacher'), and work was also deeply embedded within class strategies. For example, the profession of electrician is no longer conceived as a profession which implies training as socialisation in a set of attitudes, values and technical skills but rather as a set of dis-aggregated competencies (in the field of maintenance, in outdoor or architectural lighting, etc.), acquired directly through training, and which constitute specialisations which do not identify the individual as an electrician *tout court*. However, as is widely recognised, the nature of work is changing and work, in the sense of profession, it may be argued, is dissolving: (i) it is dissolving as a result of the increasing fragility of the wage relationship; (ii) it is dissolving through the effects of the increasing 'lightness' of firms (i.e., the bigger they are the more they tend to subdivide until they melt into the air of 'off shore paradises'); and (iii) it is dissolving into competencies. Until recently people identified themselves with their profession, with the institution where they worked, and with the set of activities that defined their 'work'. Today, it is becoming



more and more difficult for someone to identify with 'work' as it assumes a position in the increasingly volatile forms of production, distribution and consumption. That which remains appears to be definable as 'competencies'.

Braverman's thesis (1974) emphasised that the de-qualification of work in capitalist societies derived from the separation of work into its constituent elements by dividing the craft and reducing its parts. In actual fact, what was at stake was not so much a redistribution of crafts but rather a systematic subdivision of work, providing the basis for the subsequent destruction of all-round skills. At the same time, Braverman argued that the origins of management could be found in the struggle to devise the most effective means to ensure the employer's control over work.

The emergence of post-Fordist forms of production, distribution and consumption seems to impose important changes in the nature of work that apparently contradict Braverman's thesis of the long-term de-qualification of work within the framework of capitalism. It is not managerialist approaches of 'job enrichment' that we are referring to, but rather the apparent re-composition of skills and competencies that the new *learning-network-knowledge-based* economies seem to demand. To be creative, innovative, able to communicate, flexible, adaptive, and, perhaps most importantly, capable of being trained (i.e., in Bernstein's words, capable of 'responding effectively to concurrent, subsequent or intermittent pedagogies', 2001), etc., are the post-Fordist demands that appear to surpass the Fordist-Taylorist divide between *conception* and *execution* and the consequent deskilling of work. However, as Thompson argues:

Widespread deskilling is often accompanied by an increased 'qualification' of smaller layers of workers involved in planning, programming and similar tasks. But the general tendency immediately tends to reassert itself as the enhanced skills are subjected to similar subspecialisation and the embodiment of skills in more complex machinery. Braverman's evidence of progressive deskilling of computer programmers is a major example of this type of development. (Thompson, 1989, p. 81)

According to this perspective, we are not witnessing a re-composition of work into new forms of craftsmanship in which work can be re-appropriated by workers (the opposite of alienation), but, rather, an extension of the de-qualification trend. However, Thompson recognises that reality is more complex and affirms that in economic sectors with a higher proportion of investment in capital than in labour there exists a '*dual labour market* for skilled and unskilled labour within the long-term trend towards de-qualification' (*ibid.*, p. 83). It is our contention that it is towards this dual labour market that middle-class education strategies are directed, and it is within this framework that the notion of 'skills', 'competencies' and 'academic excellence' should be understood. Interesting to note in this context is Castells' argument that:

Under this new system of production, labor is redefined in its role as producer and sharply differentiated according to workers' characteristics. A

major difference refers to what I call generic labor versus self-programmable labor. The critical quality in differentiating these two kinds of labour is education, and the capacity of accessing higher levels of education; that is, embodied knowledge and information. (. . .) Education (as distinct from warehousing of children and students) is the process by which people, that is, labor, acquire the capability constantly to redefine the necessary skills for a given task, and to access the sources for learning these skills. Whoever is educated, in the proper organizational environment can reprogramme him/herself toward the endlessly changing tasks of the production process. (Castells, 1998, p. 361)

New middle-class strategies relate to this divide between 'education' and what we have termed competencies by promoting their children's access to a teaching/learning process based on 'performance' and a pedagogy of transmission. What appears to be paradoxical in this process is that the world of work based on self-programmable labour—here Ball's interviews with members of British industry come to mind (1990)—apparently emphasises what we have referred to as a learning pedagogy based on the subject of the teaching/learning process and not on the knowledge to be transmitted. Such an approach tends to promote a desire for innovation, a non-differentiated schooling and co-operative work in the classroom, all of which were referred to by Ball's interviewees.

### **The False Dichotomy: performance without pedagogy vs. pedagogy without performance**

Bernstein asks what happens to pedagogic modalities when their social base changes. In other words, what does the development of flexible capitalism mean for pedagogy? Bernstein's reply (1996) is that there has been a change from a pedagogic model based on competence, dominant from the 1950s, to a pedagogic model based on performance, dominant from the 1980s. The first model was important in the sense that it meant control by the learner of the selection, sequence and rhythm of the learning process and was based on implicit recognition and realisation rules (i.e. on an invisible pedagogy) in which all persons were considered inherently competent (Bernstein refers to the linguistic competence identified with Chomsky, the cognitive competence of Piaget, the cultural competence of Levi-Strauss, the practical competence of Garfinkle and the communicative competence of Dell Hymes). The second model places the emphasis on the specific output of he/she who learns and on the capacities necessary for the production of this specific output (a text, a product).

Here it is necessary to make a distinction between 'visible pedagogy', based on explicit recognition and realisation rules (a pedagogical modality normally identified with the domination of the education system by that class which Bernstein designates as the 'old middle class'), and that which Bernstein designates 'generic performance', based on training objectives, focused on that which occurs exterior to the school and on new sites of recontextualisation—meaning that this pedagogic mode is

constructed and distributed exterior to and independent from pedagogic recontextualising fields. In other words, the objectives of training inherent to 'generic performance' reconfigure the location of recontextualisation enabling potentially the domination of the space of pedagogic recontextualisation by the official (state) recontextualising field, thus reducing the relative autonomy of schooling and assuring control—even when remote—by the state. Generic performance requires a pedagogic modality that prepares the learner for learning about 'work and life', that is, based on an identity projected towards the exterior, instead of an identity looking inward, and which conceives work and life in the short term (short-termism). In this sense, argues Bernstein, 'he/she who learns will never know enough and will never develop all the capacities required' (cited in Bonal, 2002).

The change from a model of competence to a model based on performance, argues Bernstein, results from the fact that in the first model knowledge was linked to *habitus* (of the new middle class) and not necessarily to 'work and life'. In other words, in the first case, the market could only have an indirect ('invisible') impact on what and how one learns in the school.

In order to escape the pitfalls that the notion of competence appears to carry with it, we have analysed the debate on education policy in Portugal (*cf.* Magalhães & Stoer, 2002) by trying to avoid entering into the discussion on the more or less wide, or more or less restricted, character of the competencies to be produced by the schooling process. The price to be paid by entering into this discussion appears to us to be the limitation of the discussion to the dilemma of what count as 'good' competencies—which promote the integral development of the individual—and what count as 'bad' competencies—those which, based on the short term, only enable the individual to deal with situations, frequently in the context of the firm, relatively simple in nature and requiring low qualifications. As an alternative, we have tried to construct a heuristic *continuum* on which pedagogy and performance constitute polar opposites (see Figure 2). In placing on this continuum the different proposals for a mandate for the education system, the political nature of these proposals appears to be made more explicit. Given that one cannot be idealist with regard to the increasingly rapid selective effects of the labour market, and given that the knowledge transmitted in the education process should not aim solely at performance in a given work context, we do not oppose pedagogy to the demands of performance. If, indeed, it is true, as the most frantic neo-defenders of the meritocracy remind us, that pedagogy without performance is 'nothing', it also appears to be true that there is no performance without pedagogy, in the sense that even the most mechanically transmitted knowledge is always transmitted, meaning that it is mediated by a pedagogic process.

Thus, the assumption of the *continuum* not only permits one to map out the proposals of the different participants in the debate, it also suggests that, in the present context of a labour market structured by flexible capitalism, it is not compulsory that one remain confined to the radically pedagogical defence of education (as if pedagogical autonomy were independent with relation to the economy) nor to the reduction of education to performance (as if performance could exist without pedagogy). Alternative paths may be found in the differences




FIG. 2.

(eventually incommensurable) that structure the educational mandates and in their mutually critical analysis.

This is even more the case given that the school has ceased to be perceived by families and students as 'the' source of education and, therefore, the production of competencies. Other organisations and institutions, both public and private, as well as the most diverse contexts, provide education/formation and, as such, are sources for qualification. Enterprises, associations, social, political and religious movements and even the family now present themselves explicitly as alternatives to public schooling. The school is no longer the central socialising institution and the legitimating educational narratives of the almost redeeming mission (the creation of the new human being, of the new individual-citizen) that the project of modernity attributed to it seem to live on only in some exceptional places and in the generous minds of some of the most stoical educators. The institution and the services that it provides are now increasingly integrated in the strategies which individuals are reflexively constructing.

In a totally pedagogised society, schooling appears to see much of its relevance confined to its function of accreditation, of distributing diplomas. As a consequence of growing social and individual reflexivity, it is the school that is placed on the trajectories which individuals construct for themselves, rather than the contrary, just as many modern pedagogues dreamed might happen. That is, the school provides the 'good' material with which people construct their lives. According to Beck (1992), the capacity for each one to choose, maintain and justify her own social relations and life options is not the same for all, it is:

as any sociologist of social classes knows, a learned capacity that depends on special social and family origins. The reflexive conduct of one's life, the planning of one's biography and social relations, produces a new inequality, an inequality in dealing with insecurity and reflexivity. (1992, p. 98)

In this context, schooling arises at the same time as a mechanism for escaping one's 'social and family origins' and as a consequence of these same origins. In the same way, we think that the appearance of a new mandate for European education is not a mere product of economic determination imposed by flexible capitalism. It coincides, rather, with cultural changes that involve phenomena that range from intimacy to the re-invention of traditions and the cult of the ephemeral to the reflexive assumption of new life styles. Effectively, the implications of the changes of a cultural nature lead us to an analysis not only of life styles but also of the rise of new forms of citizenship.

### **The Reconfiguration of the Modern Social Contract, New Forms of Citizenship and Education**

The social contract, such as it was conceived by modernity, was based on a citizenship delimited by the nation-state. This was the political architecture that guaranteed individuals and groups a series of rights and social and political protection in exchange for relinquishing identities developed at the local level. That is, loyalty was no longer based on ethnic, family, religious or other forms of traditional ties, but, rather, on that which was assumed to be common to a national culture, territory, language, etc.

The project of modernity with regard to the construction of nation-states was based on the principle according to which national ties, or belonging, were as 'natural' as it was for an individual to have 'two ears and a nose' (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). Nevertheless, this 'naturalisation' of national belonging is mediated by identification processes. Modernity grounded the process of the formation of identities on three axes: (1) national identity—'You are/I am a subject of this or that country'; (2) legal or juridical identity—'You are/I am the holder of rights and duties'; (3) subjective identity—'You are/I am an aware, rational and affective being'. The legitimacy of nationality-citizenship-individuality was assured by the metanarrative of modernity that localised the Self at the crossroads of its three founding axes: Reason, Mankind and the State. These three axes duplicated themselves, in turn, into mediating

TABLE I.

Metanarrative of modernity	Mediating narratives	Identifiers
Reason	Science/Philosophy/Art	Consciousness
Humanity	Social Institutions	Individual
State	Nation-state	Citizen

narratives such as science, philosophy, art, social institutions and the state. Reason articulated the narratives of science, philosophy and art which, thus, emerge as the discursive mechanisms that, within the project of modernity, frame the development of subjectivity/individuality. In other words, modernity based its project of rationality on the fact that reason, in Cartesian fashion, was that which was best distributed throughout the world. This universality of the capacity to distinguish the real from the false made science an enterprise both of individuals as subjectivities and, even more so, of humanity. The expression of personal idiosyncrasies eventually finds more space for expression in the arts, although in the project of modernity—and it is not the objective of this work to carry this discussion further—there does not appear to be a paradigmatic contradiction between the romantic version and the eventually more rationalist Enlightenment version. History, with a capital H, developed itself as a process whose finality (in the sense of *telos*) appears as a stage on which the maximum self consciousness of the individual as humanity, and as Reason itself, should occur in the realisation of the State. It is in Hegel that this identification (Humanity [individual/subjectivity] = Reason = State) appears to have attained both the maximum of consciousness possible and the best consciousness possible. Humanity and the individual, and this latter as subject/subjectivity, come together and realise themselves in the State, ‘where liberty acquires its objectivity and lives in the fruition of itself’ (Hegel, 1965, p. 11) [1].

It is in the figure of the citizen that the three identifiers—consciousness, individual and citizen—appear to intersect with most profundity, consistency and legitimacy. The universality of Reason is only realised by the organisation of Humanity in States that, in turn, give shape to individuals as citizens. Citizenship, then, is founded on a social contract as a social ontology, that is to say, the social contract constitutes the social body as *polis* and individuals as citizens.

What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses. If we are to avoid mistakes in weighing one against the other, we must clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and possession, which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title. (Rousseau, 1993, p. 196)

The nation-states that developed during modernity found in this conception of the social contract the ultimate legitimisation of their tutelage over their subjects-citizens. Individuals gave up action on the basis of their 'inclinations' (*ibid.*, p. 25) and gave up their most immediate senses of belonging (ethnic, local) and delivered themselves, as a founding act of citizenship, to the justice of the civil state; that is, they gave up their sovereignty in order to endorse the nation-state. In compensation, individuals were guaranteed the maximum use of their capacities.

These capacities are made up of each individual's talents, brought to fruition by the achievement obtained in the different contexts of state, community and market. Thus, the social value of individuals depends upon equality of opportunities in the exercise of their talents (concretised through schooling as both the instrument and the privileged place), upon the liberty to express entrepreneurial spirit on the market and upon fraternal participation in the community.

The citizenship at the heart of this process of legitimisation finds its concretisation in the model of representative democracy. The attribution of citizenship took place, in a first moment, above all at the formal level, due to the fact that the position of individuals in the world of work determined their inclusion in the social contract. At the beginning, this process was restricted to property owners, spreading later, after a century of political struggle around claims for the recognition of the importance of labour in capitalist development, to the working classes. In a second phase, representative democracy became, one might say, 'real', in the sense that those represented increased substantially to the extent that almost all those previously excluded were now visibly present, and, as such, represented. This consolidation of representative democracy did not take place in all western countries at the same time. The blacks resident in many states in the south of the US saw their status as represented only achieved in the middle of the decade of the 1960s, and the women of some cantons in Switzerland only recently, in the 1970s, achieved the right to be represented.

Education in this model of representative democracy is, thus, attributed essentially to the School, conceived of as the socialising institution, *par excellence*, of individuals. The school is the place where their capacities both liberate themselves from the shackles of tradition and reinforce the values of the community, a community now identified with the Nation-State. It is expected that the school, in addition to developing citizens, should also prepare workers apt for moving into the occupation structure. In this way, the school and the occupational structure work together, harmoniously, in the interests of society. This republican school (Touraine, 1997) attains its apogee in the post-war years as the embodiment of mass schooling.

### **The Reconfiguration of the Modern Social Contract**

It is frequent to attribute the current questioning of the modern social contract to the end of the grand narratives, above all to the exhaustion of the meta-narrative of modernity (Lyotard, 1989). In this perspective, all seems to happen as if the West had collapsed under the weight of questioning itself as a form of political, civilisational and cultural organisation. That is, the West is implicitly a form of state

and a set of values and norms that were presented as a model to follow and as an aim of development. This model, above all from the middle of the twentieth century, was challenged, both internally and externally, by intellectuals and by political action that denounced it as phallogocentric, ethnocentric and colonialist. This denunciation of the West as a model of development had as protagonists of political action those who were refused recognition as subjects of their own action and choices: women, other cultures, other societies (for example, indigenous peoples) and life styles that managed to escape from the normativity of modern societies. The Western world, in the second half of the twentieth century exhibited clear signs of disbelief in itself. This disbelief in itself does not, however, appear to explain everything, nor, perhaps, very much. First, because never, as today, has the West (the US, the European Union and other political and economic associations which have taken on modernity as their sociocultural model) been so singular in economic, political and cultural terms and, second, because the deconstruction of the West as a model has arisen not only as a result of its own auto-critique, but also as a result of that which we termed in another work 'the rebellions of differences' (Stoer & Magalhães, 2001a).

With regard to the first aspect, diverse works and research on forms of hegemonic globalisation explain sufficiently the so-called end of history (Fukuyama, 1992) as a mystification of the perpetuation of the hegemony of the economic, cultural and political forms invented by the West (e.g. Santos, 1995; Dale, 2002). This mystification is embodied in the identification of globalisation with capitalism as a form of economic organisation and with representative democracy as a form of political organisation.

With regard to the second aspect, the assumption of voice and of action by those who during the course of modernity and of the development of nation-states saw their 'sovereignty' handed over to the civil mechanisms of these latter appears to mark an important reconfiguration of the social contract and, even more logically, of citizenship itself. In this case, it is the research on counter-hegemonic forms of globalisation that has offered explication for the emergence of an active posture on the part of differences in a world where one is 'condemned' to live among them.

Effectively, individuals and groups, whose difference was, during this period, delimited, described and activated on the basis of a citizenship founded on the nation-state, have increasingly assumed difference, with the assumption of their own voice and voice itself. And they have done so going beyond the right of citizenship designed by modernity and beyond its morale and its politics of tolerance (who is in position to tolerate whom?). These differences, based on ethnic group or on race, others on sexual orientation or on life style, even others on religious preference, to mention only these, burst forth from the interior of western societies themselves. They are not a 'threat' that the exterior has imposed; they arise, rather, from within as a new claim to sovereignty: the right to manage individual and collective life in accord with their own frames of reference, the right to educate their children according to their own convictions, to treat their sick according to their own understandings of medical practice, etc. The conditions of realisation of these new sovereignty claims will be considered below.



When we speak of the rebellions of differences, we mean by this that differences have rebelled not only against the cultural and political, but also the epistemological, yoke of Western modernity. They have refused to behave as the passive 'objects' of knowledge, such as the 'primitive' that anthropology took as its object of study, such as those 'without history', or 'without state' (or 'without land') that were to be introduced into the cycle of development, such as the mythical-magical thinker that was to receive the intellectual benefits of scientific thinking, or the thinker trapped in the concrete and which psychology would open to the riches of abstract thinking. All at the same time that they have denounced the ideal normative of what is socially and epistemologically legitimised as 'normal' (for example, the revolt of women, of sexual minorities, etc.).

Differences have taken on agency and ceased to passively accept discourses made *about* them, even the most generous. Essential to their projects has become their assumption of the role of enunciating subjects, i.e., subjects of discourses *on* themselves. And, furthermore, these discourses (based on differences and not about differences) cannot be grouped under a single coherent narrative, in which all 'others' can recognise and affirm themselves as unity. What presently characterises differences and their social relations is precisely their heterogeneity, their undeniable resistance to any process of epistemological or cultural domestication. It is for this reason that one stresses the *rebellions* of differences and not simply their rebellion, as if their differences could be united under one banner. Some post-modern positions even appear to suggest that, given the loss of centres (civilisational, ethical, aesthetical, political), what is at stake can only be thought of in terms of differences. In other words, the relational character of differences is defined not in relation to a common meaning, but in relation to alterity itself. Western culture, then, surges as difference itself and not as the standard on the basis of which alterity itself is defined.

Effectively, the reconfiguration of individual and collective citizenship appears to ineluctably escape the nation-state, whether seen as a territory, as a narrative construing identity, or as a source of social and physical protection. With regard to the latter, the question is to know how the nation-state can deal with the promotion of a 'quality' that derives from forms of economic organisation that, paradoxically, constitute a risk for the well-being of individuals, a context in which, as Beck (1992) argues, individualisation predominates over individuation.

Sovereignty, as a power exercised by delegation to the state and in the name of individuals-citizens, finds itself mitigated in two principle ways. On the one hand, supranational bodies weaken the sovereignty of states which voluntarily cede such sovereignty in exchange for economic well-being and political stability. Such a process, in its turn, weakens the feeling of belonging of individuals to national spaces. Castells, for example, in a recent work, declares:

So take the two countries I know best, France and Spain: 80 per cent of the legislation in France and Spain has to go for approval to the European Union. In that sense they are not sovereign states. (Castells, 2001, p. 121)

On the other hand, the locale, alternative modes of life and the ethnic factor appear to be emerging as important forces in the structuring of citizenship. Citizenship, thus,

becomes thought of on the basis of difference, that is, on the basis of that which distinguishes and not on the basis of that which promotes common characteristics.

Above all, this last aspect leads to a re-signification of active citizenship, as if individuals and groups made new claims for a return to the individual and collective sovereignty that was renounced in exchange for the modern social contract. This transformation, as referred to above, is notable in comparison with the forms of citizenship resulting from that same contract and which were founded precisely on that which was considered common heritage. The attribution of citizenship, by the modern social contract, was a founding act of the legitimisation of the state apparatus as guardian of the nation. This latter was assumed to be a community based on language, territory and/or religion. Such an 'imaginary community' (Anderson, 1983) gave licence to the state to exercise legitimate power, in name of that which was common to all, by attributing rights and duties. In order to be a citizen, it was enough to be born in the fold of this community.<sup>2</sup> The implications of this new multicultural form of citizenship are only now beginning to show themselves and instigate an urgent re-conceptualisation of the concept of citizenship, of the rights and duties of social actors.

The social contract of modernity that expressed the exchange referred to above (of local belonging for national loyalty) appears, indeed, to be undergoing a process of reconfiguration. This process is taking place at the site of tension between factors of an economic nature (such as the restructuration of the labour market), of a cultural nature (such as the confrontation between ways of life, for example, of ethnic origin and those based on the normative universality of the nation-state) and of a political nature (such as, for example, the effects on national sovereignty of European construction).

In the European context, the emergent social contract finds itself delimited by three dimensions, which are also demands: employability (which implies having the qualities of being both flexible and 'trainable'), local identity (which implies being able to express differences) and European citizenship (which involves the construction of a new 'imagined community'). All seems to take place as if citizenship were determined and, at the same time, actively articulated with the re-composition of the global and European economic fabric and with the repositioning of the nation-state in this context.

The emergent forms of citizenship are characterised by a strong touch of social reflexivity (Giddens, 1992), that is to say, citizenship is already not only of the order of that which is attributed. It does not result immediately from belonging to a national social category. It is emerging, rather, as that which is demanded. The sovereignty which individuals and groups ceded to the modern social contract is now being reclaimed, to the tune of 'I want my sovereignty back'. In other words, individuals and groups want to decide themselves, as we mentioned above, with regard to how they live, how they educate, how they care for themselves, how they reproduce, and so on.

At its heart, this demand is based on an appeal for economic redistribution that is combined, in variable arrangements, with the recognition of difference. In this sense, what is at stake is the possible uprising of a form of 'demanded' citizenship by

individuals and groups against social and political institutions and their respective rationalities. Still, this form of emergent citizenship, founded mainly on cultural factors, has as its presupposition the satisfaction of the realisation of social citizenship (of the sort that T. H. Marshall theorised). We are not arguing here that the recognition of differences thus expressed is dependent on reaching a 'stage' where economic equality has been assured, but rather that, in the present context, the claim for the cultural recognition of difference is at the same time a demand for economic equality.

Marshall's social citizenship (1950) developed on the basis of a form of economic redistribution normally identified with the welfare state. Social justice depended on a pro-active state with regard to the redistribution of income based on the principle of equality of opportunity, one of the pillars of representative democracy. The problem which arises today with the restructuring of the labour market is knowing to what extent it is true that inclusion in the labour contract (a basic condition of the modern social contract) signifies, in fact, access to citizenship. In other words, as Bauman (1992) has emphasised, the liberation of capital from labour, which has resulted, at least in part, from a process of re/deterritorialisation where the very territory of capital is deterritorialised (Santos, (2001) gives the example of the New York Stock Exchange), appears to imply on the part of the state a reduction of its preoccupation with the carrying out of re-distributive policies and, therefore, an undermining of the principle of equal opportunity which, as we mentioned earlier, is at the base of such policies.

The implications of this process can also be seen in the evolution of 'possessive individualism' towards 'an individualism of dispossession' (Santos, 1995b). As already mentioned above, in the modern social contract 'man, the individual, is seen as absolute natural proprietor of his own capacities, owing nothing to society for them. Man's essence is freedom to use his capacities in search of satisfactions' (McPherson, 1973, p. 199). McPherson argues further that:

. . . (t)his freedom is limited properly only by some principle of utility or utilitarian natural law which forbids harming others. Freedom therefore is restricted to, and comes to be identified with, domination over things, not domination over men. The clearest form of domination over things is the relation of ownership or possession. Freedom is therefore possession. Everyone is free, for everyone possesses at least his own capacities. (1973, p. 199)

However, the erosion of the principle of equality of opportunity by the restructuring and re/deterritorialisation of the labour market produces a situation in which, according to Santos:

The metamorphosis of a system of inequality into a system of exclusion takes place both at the national level and at the global level (. . .). At the national level, exclusion is even more serious due to the fact that no substitute for the integration of individuals through work has been invented

(. . .). The result is an individualism of dispossession, an inexorable form of destitution and loneliness. The erosion of institutional protection, being a cause, is also an effect of a new social Darwinism. Individuals are convoked to be responsible for their own destiny, for their own survival and their own safety, individual managers of their own social trajectories without dependencies and without pre-determined plans. (. . .) The individual is called upon to be master of its own destiny when all appears to be outside of its own control. Holding the individual accountable is a form of alienation; an alienation which, contrary to Marxist alienation, does not result from the exploration of waged work, but from the very absence of such work.<sup>3</sup> (1995b, p. 27–28)

In sum, one is referring to the individual dispossessed of its capacities of possession, because it finds itself in a territory undergoing decontractualisation, a process taking place both in the economic sphere and in the cultural sphere. In the economic sphere, the process of re/deterritorialisation, in its creation of new territories where labour is not present, undermines the social contract by way of the restructuring of the labour market (Magalhães & Stoer, 2002). In the cultural sphere, it is not the modern social contract that new citizenship claims desire, but rather a new contract in which difference, in the name of people themselves, is inscribed. In order to defend itself against this new situation, the individual is obliged to permanently retrain/re-educate itself for the work situation, acquiring the competencies necessary for a volatile labour market (above all at the level of what Castells terms 'generic labour'—see above. Thus, the individual becomes vulnerable to a form of social and cognitive injustice that conditions its very status as citizen.

The main conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis is the need to rethink redistribution policies not only on the basis of 'new' territories (local, regional and supranational), but also on the basis of deterritorialised territories. That is, one can sustain on the basis of our argument that social citizenship requires the political regulation of all territories, without exception. Even deterritorialised territories (those in which, for example, as mentioned above, flows financial capital) are politically coloured and, as such, require regulation. Indeed, the fact that social citizenship requires the political regulation of territories suggests that one can also think of regulation *as* emancipation (and not just as its polar opposite). In this sense, the work of Mary Kaldor (1995) is interesting for it proposes a model of European construction based on themes (such as human rights, security, environment, economic and financial management) and not on territory. Habermas as well, in his appeal for the elaboration of a European Constitution, defends the need to 'corral markets' and to 'confront the tendency of capitalism to produce environmental chaos' (Habermas, 1999; 2001). The proposal of Sousa Santos, for a bottom-up form of globalisation on the basis of 'cosmopolitanism' (as an alternative to top-down 'globalised localisms') and for 'common heritage of humanity' (as an alternative to 'localised globalisms') also goes in this direction. Finally, Giorgio Agamben's (1993) concept of a 'relation of reciprocal extraterritoriality' suggests the need to conceive European construction not as an 'impossible Europe of Nations', but rather as a

European space that rather than coinciding with national homogeneous territories, or with their topographical sum, points to the 'rediscovery of the ancient vocation of European cities' (1993, pp. 24–25).

### **'Difference is us'**

In fact, there no longer exists an institutional place sufficiently legitimated that can enunciate what differences exist and what their limits are. New forms of citizenship thus arise as differences by themselves whose legitimacy resides in themselves ('as different, we have the right to be equal'). The question lies in knowing what the limit of this coincidence of citizenship with difference is. For example, to what extent can one justify that the state demand observance of compulsory education by female gypsy children at the same time that it claims to recognise the cultural practices of an ethnic group? Or to what extent is it socially legitimate that what has been recognised as a handicap (for example, deafness) is reconfigured as difference and, therefore, as identity (a woman, deaf and lesbian, determined to have a deaf son by way of artificial insemination, states: 'for me, deafness is an identity and not a handicap' (*Público*, 14 April, 2002)).

The modern social contract legitimated itself—it is worth stressing once again—on the basis of community belonging and on the imagination of that which commonly united individuals and groups at the national level. In a first phase, the national saga not only gave centrality to the state as provider and regulator, it also attributed to the nation and nationals a legitimate ethnocentrism: citizens of the nation-state, on the basis of their undeniable ontology, would determine who were to be the 'other'—both the external 'other' and the internal 'other'. For example, the external 'other' for the Portuguese were the Spanish, the French and the English, both as original enemies and as inevitable allies. The internal 'other' was, for example, the gypsy, who, since the sixteenth century, has punctuated national territory, and the peoples 'discovered' by the Portuguese explorers, to mention only these. The discourse of economic modernisation has found, perhaps, even other 'others' (such as so-called 'traditional man') whose cultural difference made them an obstacle to the internal 'civilisation' process. Still, it is always by way of the nation-state, or on the basis of its motives, that the 'other', 'them', are delimited.

The meta-narrative of modernity, in turn, based on Reason, Humanity and History, founded, as we mentioned above, the national narrative itself. As a consequence, the 'other' was also delimited by the dominant forms of rationality, of social organisation and of representation of the past and future, as far as these were developed by western societies. This grand narrative of modernity legitimated, on the one hand, the action of nation-states in all their centrality, and, on the other, the designation and classification of the 'other'. Presently, even the discourses and practices most concerned with the recognition of difference, with the 'other', are frequently victims of the modern matrix from which they part. These discourses continue to be the *locus* for determining difference, for deciding what difference is acceptable (tolerated) and which difference is real difference and who may express it. With whom should one talk? Is Le Pen as a partner in dialogue less valid than

Malcolm X? Is it possible to distinguish between the cultural practice of female circumcision and the decision to have a deaf child?

With the emergence of a form of 'demanded', or 'claimed', citizenship, and given this form has its origins, in the last analysis, in the incomplete character of the nation-state citizenship attributed through the modern social contract, the *locus* of determination of who is different has pluralised itself in such a way that there is apparently no longer any way of resolving this question at the nation-state level. The incompleteness of attributed citizenship derives from the fact that it is intrinsically incapable of translating recognition into participative citizenship. Gypsies, for example, although recognised as citizens in a universal sense, see their participation in society limited by ignorance of their difference as gypsies. In becoming pluralised, the voices of individuals and groups oblige difference to be seen and heard in the first person, both singular and plural: 'difference is me'; 'difference is us'.

### **New Forms of Citizenship and the Challenge of the Political Management of Education Systems**

The re-composition of the modern social contract and the new emergent forms of citizenship result in subtle dilemmas for all those involved, at diverse levels, in the political management of education, above all of public education. This is especially true for those who see in education a privileged form of emancipation, that is, for those who see in education systems means for contributing, more or less, to the autonomy of individuals and groups. The dilemma consists in the fact that the very project of public education implies a proposal of 'Us' for 'Them', and all projects start off, in one way or another, from the optimistic assumption that their premises are just and their aims desirable. When 'They' start to resist participation in the project, not because of pedagogical difficulties, but due to option ('we don't want "your" education'), politicians and educators—especially the most generous—feel increasingly crushed by the weight of this resistance which is, at heart, a refusal.

Look, for example, at the relationship between gypsy communities and the school in Portugal. As is known, there has been an increase in recent years in the number of gypsy children going to school. Many analysts refer to this increment as related to the contract at the basis of the Minimum Income Programme, that is, this income is only given to families that assure that their children go to school. The aim (and the benevolence) of this policy is that, in this way, it is possible to integrate, via schooling, gypsy children into modern society, making them, in turn, potentially more employable on the labour market. Integration into the labour market by way of schooling constitutes, as Lenhardt and Offe have emphasised (1984), the first step in the transition from 'passive proletarianisation' (made up of undermining previous conditions of the use of labour power) to 'active proletarianisation' (made up of a first phase of contractualisation which includes central components such as motivation for waged work and the acquisition of the competencies necessary for carrying out such work). However, what happens is that some voices from the gypsy community are heard declaring that the exchange 'schooling for Minimum Wage' is not only a form of cultural bribery but that it is also the imposition of a form (and ethic) of work that

clearly challenges the gypsy community's right to educate its children according to its way of life and to the norms, values and precepts (including prohibiting girls from attending school with the start of menstruation) which make it up. The experience of 'home schooling' in the US (see Apple, 2000) shows that there exists an important number of individuals and groups, in the USA, that prefer to educate their children at home rather than risk the eventually negative effects that schooling may have on their beliefs, values and local ways of living. It is also true that this home-schooling movement is at times related to, and in many ways symbolises, frustration not with that which exists in the school, but, rather, with that which (they would say) does not exist, such as: discipline; hard work; selective assessment; promotion of competition; etc.

All takes place, then, as if the 'other' no longer is able to tolerate even the tolerance and generosity of which he or she is the object, precisely because the 'other' refuses to be an object and aims at claiming its own voice as subject of itself. There is in this attitude an evident link with the revolt of social groups which in the past put at cause the development of the capitalist economy and which demanded redistribution policies based upon, above all (as mentioned earlier in this text), the principle of equality of opportunity. And, as we have seen, the response (even today not only incomplete but newly threatened by an individualist and unpredictable casino capitalism) was developed through the attribution, by the nation-state, of a citizenship that was above all social. But what we wish to underline here is the increasing demand for a policy based on the recognition of difference, on the claim for a form of justice that is not only socio-economic but also cultural. This demand, elaborated on the basis of identity(ies), places once again on the agenda a local demand that, in refusing to be identified with the territory of the nation-state, sees itself as identifiable with multiple locales which extend across the world.

Caught up between the generous and apparently de-centred concern with regard to the 'other' and the refusal of the 'other' to be object of this preoccupation, politicians and educators appear to be disarmed and disoriented. Disarmed, because the system of ideas that gave substance to their intentions and their practices appears to crumble under its own weight; disoriented, because, at ground level, they are confronted by an education system full of 'others' apparently deaf and indifferent to the generosity of the aims of education.

The possible solutions for this situation appear to be related to the following three considerations. In the first place, the new forms of 'demanded', or 'claimed', citizenship can only be sustained with the consolidation of modern, or attributed, citizenship, particularly true in semi-peripheral countries like Portugal. That is, the conditions of realisation of the claims of sovereignty inherent to 'demanded' citizenship are dependent upon, and simultaneous with, redistribution policies (for the reason that there is no quality without the question of quantity being minimally resolved). In the second place, the 'other', itself, has to recognise 'our' difference: in this conflict (dialogue), *difference is also us*. We all go to the bazaar (a place that is simultaneously public and private, made up of commercial transactions, activities of leisure and pleasure, filled with colours, smells and unsubmitive noises (Stoer & Magalhães, 2001a)), for the most varied of reasons, as different persons, and it is as

such that we meet each other there. 'Attributed citizenship' cannot hide this fact, which it tends to do when the question of quantity is not minimally resolved, that is, when there are no effective redistribution policies. In the third place, schooling has to be placed on the trajectories of social and cultural actors, and not the contrary. This means that the school itself also has to become a 'demand', a 'claim', and cease to be simply 'attributed'. In other words, the school as meritocracy constitutes perhaps the most important redistribution policy of democratic societies. But, as a redistribution policy, it appears to have, already for some time, become entangled in its own mesh and run out of steam. Its renovation depends upon its capacity to de-centre, to take on development logics that are not restricted to the nation-state level. To assume these other logics is, to all intents and purposes, the re-foundation of the school, and it is here that the appeal for new forms of citizenship can constitute one of its main axes.

It is paradoxical that at a time when so much emphasis is placed on inclusion, inclusive schooling and the so-called 'inclusive society', social exclusion appears to be more the norm than social inclusion. Unless one takes as a starting point the idea that the market is that which defines inclusion, having replaced in this function the nation-state and its paradigm of social protection under the banner of the welfare state or *Etat Providence*. In this sense, inclusion can be seen as one of the discourses that enables the market to deterritorialise social relations at the nation-state level and then reterritorialise them at the supranational level. Thus, instead of regulating practices of exclusion, a global space is created where all persons, regardless of their differences, are *included* as consumers. The paradox here, of course, is that inclusion is promoted on the basis of the eradication of differences rather than being defined on the basis of difference itself. This process is, once again, similar to the one carried out by the nation-state as it developed over the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for, here too, it was that which peoples shared in common (territory, language, religion, ethnic group, history) that became the determining factor for the definition of those included in the nation space and thus apt for citizenship.

Of course, the definition of inclusion based on the exclusion—or attempted eradication—of difference means almost inevitably new forms of exclusion, economic, social, political, cultural. Thus the starting point for an alternative conception of inclusion is reflection upon difference(s) and, on the basis of the way those differences are present in (European) societies, on social exclusion itself.

## NOTES

- [1] It was perhaps Nietzsche who, for the first time and in a radical way, questioned modernity through a critique of Reason based on values (Nietzsche, 1976), that is, on the basis of a process (moral) external to reason. This made it possible to de-centre Reason and to unveil it as a non-universal discourse, masked by abstraction and universality.
- [2] We recognise that not all 'communities' are of the same type. Morris (1994) distinguishes, for example, between 'communities of assent' (a kind of voluntary association) and 'communities of descent' (based on, for example, matrilineal descent).
- [3] Robert Castel (1997) has referred to this phenomenon as the 'new social question' in which the excluded are no longer those exploited but indispensable; they are, rather, simply in excess. In this sense, being exploited becomes almost a privilege.



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